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AmygdalaHumans show substantial deviation from rationality during economic decision making under uncertainty. A
computational perspective suggests these deviations arise out of an interaction between distinct valuation
systems in the brain. Here, we provide behavioural data showing that the incidental presentation of aversive
and appetitive conditioned stimuli can alter subjects’ preferences in an economic task, involving a choice
between a safe or gamble option. These behavioural effects informed a model-based analysis of a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, involving an identical paradigm, where we demonstrate
that this conditioned behavioral bias engages the amygdala, a brain structure associated with acquisition and
expression of conditioned associations. Our ﬁndings suggest that a well known bias in human economic
choice can arise from an inﬂuence of conditioned associations on goal-directed decision making, consistent
with an architecture of choice that invokes distinct decision-making systems.roscience, University College
.
ip).
license. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license. Introduction
The idea that humans are optimal decisionmakers is challenged by
substantial evidence for deviations from rationality during economic
decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Across a variety of
contexts, preferences can depend on seemingly arbitrary factors
irrelevant to decision outcomes (Kahneman et al., 1991; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981, 1986). The observation that equivalent biases are
observed in non-human primates (Chen et al., 2006; Lakshminar-
yanan et al., 2008), suggests these deviations may, in part, reﬂect
processes and neural substrates that are strongly conserved across
phylogeny. It is of interest that functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies that have probed the neural underpinnings
of one form of decision bias, namely framing, consistently report
amygdala activation (De Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al., 2009), an
evolutionary conserved brain structure implicated both in emotional
learning in humans and other animals (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005).
Classical explanations of human decision biases often invoke a
dual system framework pitting a deliberative rational system against
an impulsive myopic affective system (Camerer et al., 2005).
However, psychological and neurobiological data point to a more
complicated architecture, identifying at least three distinct valuation
systems that can compete for control of action. These systems involve
Pavlovian, goal directed and a habitual controllers respectively
(Dayan, 2008; Seymour and Dolan, 2008). The most basic is a
Pavlovian system which learns to predict the value of states andrelates these to innate hard-wired behaviour repertoires, such as
approach or withdrawal. A more sophisticated goal-directed system
uses an explicit model of the environment to choose an appropriate
course of action to attain a desired outcome. Finally, the habitual
system relies on cached predictions of the expected reward for the set
of all possible actions. This type of decision architecture can account
for otherwise puzzling behaviour as can arise when there is conﬂict
between Pavlovian and instrumental systems for control of behavior
(Dayan et al., 2006). Indeed, hints that such inﬂuences may be
important in human choice behaviour emerges from previous
research showing subjects are more likely to choose an action if a
conditioned cue that has previously been paired with the same
outcome is present (Bray et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 2007; Talmi et al.,
2008).
In this study our aim was to establish whether incidental
inﬂuences of conditioned associations, generated through prior
conditioning, could elicit a bias in economic decision making similar
in form to that seen when outcomes of equivalent expected value are
described in terms of a loss or a gain, a well know human bias referred
to as ‘framing’. The ‘disease dilemma’ is a popular example of this
effect that requires subjects to choose between two scenarios relating
to the management of an epidemic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). A
risky option is ﬁxed, such as ‘Option A has 2/3 chances to save all 600
affected people,’ but a non-risky option is presented in either a
positive ‘With option B, 400 people will be saved’ or negative frame
‘With option B, 200 people will die’. A robust ﬁnding is that the
probability of choosing the risky option increases when the sure
option is presented in a negative frame.
Our experimental paradigm (Fig. 1) alternated two entirely
independent tasks involving either an instrumental conditioning
Fig. 1. Experimental paradigm. Two tasks were alternated: the instrumental conditioning or learning task and the ﬁnancial decision making or gamble task. Time is displayed in
milliseconds. (A) On learning trials, two colored fractals were presented on the screen; subjects selected one of them, and subsequently observed the outcome. There were 3 pairs: a
win, a loss, and neutral pair. In this example, the chosen fractal was associated with losing £10 or losing nothing with 0.8 and 0.2 probabilities, respectively. (B) Each gamble trial
began with amessage showing themaximum amount of money that could be won in the trial, followed by a choice between a win-all/lose-all gamble (displayed here on the right as
a chart pie) and a safe option with equal expected outcomes. The safe option was depicted as a bold number over one a fractal from the learning task: the one associated with 0.8
probability of winning (CSwin), the one associated with 0.8 probability of losing (CSlose), or a neutral fractal (CS-). Subjects were not explicitly told about this manipulation and both
tasks were explained as independent of each other. No feedback was provided concerning trial outcomes.
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task).We studied 3 separate cohorts of healthy volunteers (n=20, 16,
and 20, respectively) in 3 independent experiments. Experiment 3
was performed while we acquired simultaneous fMRI data with the
aim of identifying a neurobiological substrate to the behavioral effects
seen in experiment 1 and 2. Both experiment 1 and 2 differ in the time
duration of each trial (shorter in experiment 2) and in number of
sessions (larger in experiment 2), whereas in experiment 2 and 3 the
same protocol was used. This was motivated by a need to adapt and
test the protocol from our initial behavioral experiment (experiment
1) to the fMRI environment in order to explore its neurobiological
underpinnings. We hypothesized that a bias in decision making
during the gamble task engendered by an incidental presentation of
conditioned stimuli would lead to amygdala activation, an hypothesis
motivated by ﬁndings that this brain area is activated in relation to
irrational choices in the classical framing effect (De Martino et al.,
2006; Roiser et al., 2009).
Materials and methods
Subjects
A total of 67 healthy and right handed volunteers were recruited
for inclusion in 3 separate experiments: 25 in experiment 1 (13
female, mean age=25.2 years, SD=4.2 years), 18 in experiment 2 (7
female, mean age=24.71 years, SD=4.95), and 24 in experiment 3
(12, female, mean age=22.2 years, SD=3.94). Any subject that failed
to show gambling during the task (b0.5% of their choices) was
excluded from analysis (5 subjects from experiment 1, 2 from
experiment 2, and 4 from experiment 3). The study was conducted
with the approval of the University College London Research Ethics
Committee.
Experimental paradigm
The experiment consisted of two independent alternating tasks, an
instrumental conditioning task and a gamble task. An initial learning
phase involved an instrumental task withmonetary outcomes, similarto that used by Pessiglione et al. (2006), where a pair of colored fractal
images was visually displayed on a monitor with subjects being
required to select one of them with an explicit goal to maximize their
total wins. A total of 3 pairs were used during the entire experiment: a
win pair (generated by appetitive conditioning), a lose pair (gener-
ated by aversive conditioning), and a neutral pair (always followed by
a nil outcome £0). More speciﬁcally, each of these pairs was associated
with two outcomes: win £10/£0, lose £10/£0, and £0/£0. For the gain
pair, the probabilities of winning £10/£0 were 0.8/0.2 for one
stimulus and 0.2/0.8 for the other. Similarly, in the lose pair, the
probabilities of losing £10/£0 were 0.8/0.2 for one stimulus and 0.2/
0.8 for the other. Subjects were told to learn, by trial and error,
stimulus-outcome (reward or loss) associations for the win and lose
pairs. Thus, on each trial, one of the pairs was randomly presented
with the two stimuli displayed right or left from the centre of the
screen (see Fig. 1A). The relative position of the stimuli was
counterbalanced across trials. Subjects were required to choose the
right or left stimulus by pressing a right or left arrow on a keyboard in
experiment 1 and 2 or by pressing a right or left key in a MRI-
compatible keypad in experiment 3. 2000 ms after the stimuli were
presented (3000 ms in experiment 1) the choice was highlighted
within a red square for 500 ms. Thereafter, the outcomewas displayed
on the screen for another 2000 ms, and a ﬁxation cross was displayed
for 500 ms before the following trial begun.
The gamble task was similar to the one used to elicit the framing
effect (De Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al., 2009). At the beginning of
each trial, subjects were shown a message for 2000 ms indicating the
maximum amount of money they could win in the trial. Five amounts
of winnings were used in all experiments (£20, £15, £10, £5, £1).
Thereafter, subjects were instructed to make a choice between a win-
all/lose-all gamble and a safe option with equal expected value (with
the exception of catch trials, see below) displayed on the screen for
3000 ms in experiment 1 and for 1500 ms in experiment 2 and 3 (see
Fig. 1B). To win the maximum amount of money, participants had to
choose the gamble which was represented as a pie chart depicting the
probability of winning the gamble in green and the probability of
losing the gamble in red. A number in bold font, depicted over the pie
chart, indicated themaximum amount of money that could be won on
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such that the probability of winning the gamble in a given trial was
0.8, 0.6, 0.4, or 0.2. This contrasted with the safe option which paid a
portion of the total amount with probability of 1. The safe option was
depicted as a bold number on the other side of the screen and was
superimposed over one of the fractals used in the learning task
comprising a fractal associated with a high probability of winning
(CSwin), one associated with a high probability of losing (CSlose) or
one of the neutral fractals (CS-). The CS's were never presented under
the gamble option since the experimental question rested on testing
whether effects observed in a classical framing task (De Martino et al.,
2006; Roiser et al., 2009) could be recreated solely by replacement of
the words ‘keep’ and ‘lose’ on the safe option by imposition of
conditioned stimuli (CSwin and CSlose) that signaled a win or loss
respectively. The CS- condition represented a behavioral control
condition to enable us to assess the impact of the learned value,
generated by presentation of the CSwin and CSlose, on a decision to
opt for the sure or gamble option in the economic task. This exact
design pertained to each of the 3 separate experiments.
Subjects were not explicitly told the reasoning behind presenta-
tion of fractal stimuli during the economic decision task. In fact, they
were told both tasks were independent. Just as in the instrumental
conditioning task, subjects choose the option on the right or the left by
pressing a right or left arrow on a keyboard in experiment 1 and 2 or
by pressing a right or left key in a MRI-compatible keypad in
experiment 3. Trials with different CSs, maximum amounts and
different probabilities of winning the gamble were randomly inter-
mixed. No feedback concerning trial outcomes was given during the
experiment and subjects were told that, at the end of the experiment,
three trials of the learning task and three trials of the gamble task
would be randomly selected and that theywould get paid the selected
amount up to a maximum of £45.
Given the equivalence of choices in terms of expected value, we
included ‘catch’ trials to ensure that subjects remained engaged in the
decision-making task throughout the course of the experiment. In
these trials, the expected outcomes for the sure and gamble option
were markedly unbalanced: in half of the trials the gamble option had
a 0.95 probability of winning and was highly preferable and for the
other half of the trials the sure option was preferable since the
probability of winning the gamble was only 0.05. As in the rest of the
trials, the sure option was also displayed over one of the fractals used
in the learning task. As illustrated in Fig. S4, subjects were highly
accurate in making optimal decisions in these trials indicating a stable
task engagement.
Experiment 1 and 2 were pure behavioral experiments, whereas
experiment 3 was performed inside the scanner. In order to get
familiarized with the tasks subjects were given practice and any
questions that arose were answered. After that, subjects performed
several trials of the instrumental conditioning task (learning task): 24
trials of each pair in experiment 1 (7.5 min), and 30 trials of each pair
in experiment 2 and 3 (8.5 min). After these initial trials of the
learning task, subjects participated in 2 sessions (19.5 min each) of
alternating tasks in experiment 1, and 3 sessions (12.7 min each) of
alternating task in experiment 2 and 3. Prior to a task block subjects
were instructed with the name of the task which was about to begin
(learning or gamble task) for 1000 ms. In each session of the
alternating task, 10 trials of the gamble task were followed by 9 trials
of the learning task (3 of each pair) with a total of 80 gamble trials (20
trials with the CSwins, 20 trials with the CSlose, 20 trials with the CS-,
and 20 ‘catch’ trials. The order of the trials was randomized to increase
design efﬁciency. We alternated the two tasks in order to prevented
extinction of the association between the CS and win and lose
outcomes as subjects performed the separate gamble task.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were debriefed and asked
about their strategies when performing the task, their awareness of
the presence of the CS from learning task in the gamble task, andwhether this manipulation changed their choice preference in the
gamble task.
Behavioral data analysis
The behavioral data were analyzed using the statistic software
SPSS. We used a 2 way repeated-measures ANOVA with CS (CSwin;
CSlose; CS-) and session (session 1 and session 2 in experiment 1; and
session 1, session 2, and session 3 in experiments 2 and 3) as factors
on the percentage of trials in which subjects chose the gamble option.
Computational model
The inﬂuence of the CS on gamble preference was observed to
change as a function of session in experiment 3. To render our imaging
analysis sensitive to this session effect, and capture the neural
underpinnings of the behavioral effect expressed in the scanning
environment, we generated a parametric regressor of the CS effects on
a trial-by-trial basis. We modeled the learning and the gamble tasks
separately. The trial by trial estimates of the action-state values (Q) for
choosing the different stimuli in the learning task were used to
generate biases induced by these stimuli in our modeling of the
gamble task. For completeness, we also applied the model to the data
of experiment 1 and 2 and show these simulations in supplemental
data.
Modeling of the learning data
For the learning task data, we ﬁtted a standard reinforcement
learning algorithm to each subject's sequence of choices (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). We used a basic Q learning algorithm, as this provides a
good account of instrumental choice in both humans and primates
(O'Doherty, 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Samejima et al., 2005). For
each pair of stimuli a and b, the model estimates the expected value of
choosing a (Qa) and choosing b (Qb), on the basis of individual
sequences of choices and outcomes. This Q value is essentially the
expected reward obtained by taking that particular action (since there
are no longer term consequences of these choices). The Q values were
set at zero before learning, and after every trial tN0 the value of the
chosen stimulus (say a) was updated according to the following rules:
Qa t + 1ð Þ = Qa tð Þ + α*δ tð Þ
where δ(t) is the prediction error:
δ tð Þ = R tð Þ−Qa tð Þ
forR(t) being the reinforcement obtained as anoutcomeof choosing a at
trial t. The reinforcement magnitude R was +10 and−10 for winning
and losing £10, and 0 for those outcomes without any monetary
consequence. Given the Q values, the associated probability of selecting
each action (say a) was estimated via the softmax rule:
Pa tð Þ = exp β*Qa tð Þð Þ= ðexp β*Qa tð Þ + exp β*Qb tð Þð Þð Þ
This is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the
probability of taking one out of a set of actions according to their
associated values which has been shown to account for choice behavior
in similar paradigms (Daw et al., 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006).
The constants αi (learning rate) and βi (temperature) were
adjusted individually for each subject (i) to maximize the likelihood
of the actual observed choices under the model. The mean α/β
parameters for the win and lose pairs, respectively, were 0.2/0.56 and
0.28/0.45 in experiment 1, 0.11/0.76 and 0.29/0.58 in experiment 2,
and 0.26/0.6 and 0.23/0.58 in experiment 3. The individual subjects’
parameters are reported in Figs. S7–S9. These mean parameters were
used to generate the simulations shown in Fig. 2C and Figs. S5C and
S6C. Themean likelihood of the actual choices under themodel, across
Fig. 2. Behavioral results. This ﬁgure displays mean percentage of trials in which subjects chose the gamble option for each of the CS's displayed under the safe option. Error bars
indicate SEM. Post hoc comparisons were implemented by means of repeated-measures t-test: * Pb0.05; **Pb0.005. (A) Outside the scanner, subjects showed an increased
preference for the gamble option when the CS loss stimulus was presented with the sure option and a decreased preference when the CSwin was displayed during the whole
experiment. (B) Outside the scanner, this effect was stronger during the last session of the experiment. (C) Inside the scanner, the emergence of the behavioral effect was not evident
if all sessions were considered together. (D) Inside the scanner, the behavioral effect and became only evident during the third session.
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0.83 in experiment 3. As a measure of the quality of the behavioral ﬁt
of the computational model we report a pseudo-R2 statistic (Daw
et al., 2006) in Tables S1-S3.
Modeling of the gamble data
For the gamble task data, we ﬁtted each subject's sequence of
choices using a variation of the softmax rule used in the learning task
that accounted for the observed behavioral data. On each trial of the
gamble task there were two options, the safe and the gamble option,
with equal expected value. According to the softmax rule, equivalence
in expected value results in choice indifference. However, each
subject showed a different underlying preference for the gamble and
the sure option which wemodeled as a subject-speciﬁc parameter (λi,
for subject i) added to the value of the sure option. λi would be
positive for a risk-averse subject and negative for a risk-seeking
subject. Moreover, as observed in the behavioral data, subjects’
preference for the gamble or sure option was modiﬁed by the
presence of the different CSs, and this effect differed across sessions.
To account for these behavioral observations we added a bias value
(Qcs) to the expected value of the safe option and weighted it by a
second, subject (i) and session (s)-speciﬁc parameter, εis. Qcs were
obtained on a trial by trial basis by modeling the learning task and
were equivalent to the current Q value of the CS displayed under the
safe option. Note that although subjects reached asymptote in the
learning task, the Qcs value was not stable throughout the gamble task
as they were dependent on choices in the learning task that alternated
with the gamble task. QCS value was positive for CSwin and negative
for CSlose, thereby increasing or decreasing the value of the sure
option, an approach similar to that previously implemented in a
model of Pavlovian–instrumental interactions (Dayan et al., 2006).
Since the expected value of both options was equal, we could
simplify the softmax rule and reduce the β parameter or temperature
to the following:
Psure tð Þ = expðεis* Qcs tð Þ + λiÞ= ðexpðεis* Qcs tð Þ + λiÞ + 1Þand
Pgamble tð Þ = 1− Psure tð Þ:
We calculated the λi for each subject using the mean probability of
choosing the sure option in trials where the CS- was displayed under
the safe option. Since on these trials Q=0,
λi = log Psure = 1−Psureð Þð Þ:
The constant εis was the only parameter that was ﬁtted to
maximize the likelihood of the actual choices under the model, a
parameter that we allowed to take on a different value for each of the
modeled sessions. In experiment 1, the mean λ was 0.53, and the
mean ε was 0.05 and 0.1 for session 1 and 2, respectively. In
experiment 2, the mean λ was 0.41, and the mean ε was−0.02, 0.03,
and 0.07 for session 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Finally, in experiment 3,
the mean λwas 0.15, and the mean εwas−0.01,−0.007, and 0.03 for
session 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The individual subjects’ epsilon
parameters are reported in Figs. S7–S9. Note that for experiment 3 the
mean ε parameter only differed from 0 for the last session in line with
the emergence of the key behavioral bias (mean ε in session 1 was
−0.01, t19=0.7, pN0.1; mean ε in session 2 was −0.007, t19=0.75,
pN0.1; mean ε in session 3 was 0.03, t19=2.9, p=0.009). These
parameters were used to generate the simulations shown in Fig. 2C
and Figs. S5C and S6C.
The mean likelihood of the actual choices under the model, across
all gamble trials, was 0.61 in experiment 1, 0.58 in experiment 2, and
0.57 in experiment 3. As a measure of the quality of the behavioral ﬁt
of the computational model we report a pseudo-R2 statistic (Daw
et al., 2006) in Tables S1-S3.We acknowledge that a lack of alternative
models with which to compare the model ﬁt precludes any strong
conclusion about the computational implementation of this speciﬁc
model. Moreover, the mean and individual pseudo-R2 reveals that
this is clearly not a good model for the subjects' behavior: in many
subjects the pseudo-R2 is virtually 0 and in some cases it is even
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perform better. However, our intention in using this model was solely
to capture key features of the inﬂuence of the CS's on decisionmaking,
namely differences in probability of gambling according to whether a
CS displayed under the safe option was associated with wins or loses
in the learning task. Moreover, because the model allowed us to
construct a parametric regressor of the CS effect on the gamble task in
fMRI data analysis, this had the added value of increasing the power of
our analysis.Image acquisition and analysis
For experiment 3, we performed fMRI on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra
magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with echo
planar imaging (EPI). In the functional session 48 T2*-weighted
images per volume (covering whole head) with blood oxygenation
level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were obtained (matrix: 64×64; 48
oblique axial slices per volume angled at−30° in the antero-posterior
axis; spatial resolution: 3×3×3 mm; TR=2880 ms; TE=30 ms). The
fMRI acquisition protocol was optimized to reduce susceptibility-
induced BOLD sensitivity losses in inferior frontal and temporal lobe
regions (Weiskopf et al., 2006). For each subject functional data were
acquired in three scanning sessions containing 260 volumes per
session. Six additional volumes at the beginning of each series were
acquired to allow for steady state magnetization and were subse-
quently discarded. Anatomical images of each subject's brain were
collected using T1 weighted sequences (spatial resolution:
1×1×1 mm). Additionally, individual ﬁeld maps were recorded
using a double echo FLASH sequence (matrix size=64×64; 64 slices;
spatial resolution=3×3×3 mm; gap=1 mm; short TE=10 ms;
long TE=12.46 ms; TR=1020 ms) for distortion correction of the
acquired EPI images (Weiskopf et al., 2006). Using the ‘FieldMap
toolbox’ (Hutton et al., 2002) ﬁeld maps were estimated from the
phase difference between the images acquired at the short and long
TE.
Pre-processing included realignment, unwrapping using individ-
ual ﬁeldmaps, and ﬁnally spatial normalizing to the Montreal
Neurology Institute (MNI) space and smoothing with a 4 mm
Gaussian kernel. The fMRI time series data were high-pass ﬁltered
(cutoff=128 s) andwhitened using an AR(1)-model. For each subject
a statistical model was computed by applying a canonical hemody-
namic response function (HRF) combined with time and dispersion
derivatives (Friston et al., 1998).
At the ﬁrst level model all sessions were concatenated and the
following 4 conditions of interest were modeled as events at the onset
of the trial: trials in which subjects chose the sure option where the
CSwin was displayed under the safe option (Sure/CSwin), trials in
which subjects chose the gamble option where the CSwin was
displayed under the safe option (Gamble/CSwin), trials in which
subjects chose the sure option where the CSlose was displayed under
the safe option (Sure/CSlose), and trials in which subjects chose the
gamble option where the CSlose was displayed under the safe option
(Gamble/CSlose). As parametric modulator for each of the above
regressors we used, on each trial, ε*|QCS| derived from ﬁtting the
computational model to each individual's data. These parametric
modulators were based on a group-wise model ﬁt. This allowed us to
index brain activity that scaled with the strength of the observed
behavioral bias in a 2 × 2 factorial design with decision (gamble or
sure) and CS as main factors. We also modeled separately the
following regressors of no interest: trials in which subjects chose the
safe option and the CS- was displayed under the safe option, trials in
which subjects chose the gamble option and the CS- was displayed
under the safe option, the catch trials, and each of the pairs of the
learning task that were alternated among the gamble trials. Finally, to
capture residual movement-related artifacts six covariates (the threerigid-body translation and three rotations resulting from realign-
ment) were also included as regressors of no interest.
As described, the primary aim of our neuroimaging analysis was to
capture brain areas mediating the observed bias in decision making
induced by a display under the safe option of either the CSwin or the
CSlose predictive conditioned stimuli. The interaction contrast [(Sure/
CSwin+Gamble/CSlose) − (Gamble/CSwin+Sure/CSlose)] of our
parametric regressors captures this effect and allows for identiﬁcation
of brain areas that show high activity when subjects chose the safe
option when the CSwin is displayed and when they chose the gamble
option when the CSlose is displayed (see Fig. 1B). In other words our
focus is on choices that account for the observed bias. Critically, a two
by two interaction contrast is balanced with respect to the two main
effects such that brain activity in the interaction contrast is
uncontaminated by effects attributable to either the decision (safe
or gamble option) or the valence associated with the CS (win or lose).
Moreover, our parametric regressorweights this simple interaction by
a session speciﬁc parameter that relates to the magnitude of the
behavioral impact of CS's on the decision-making process. Therefore,
by using a parametric regressor we test for brain areas supporting the
emergence of a CS induced bias with the progression of the
experiment.
Parameter estimates were used to calculate the interaction
contrast for each individual subject. These contrast images were
entered into a second level one-sample t-test across subjects (random
effects analysis). Our a priori hypothesis pointed to the amygdala as
the most likely candidate to mediate biases induced by presentation
of CSs. First, activation of the amygdala has been found in two
previous experiments studying the framing effect which is analogous
to the biases that wewant to explain with the present experiment (De
Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al., 2009). Moreover, a substantial
animal literature has established the amygdala as important in the
acquisition and expression of conditioned behaviors regardless of the
valence of the CSs (Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Cardinal et al., 2002).
Therefore, we restricted our primary analysis of interest to regions
subsumed within an inclusive mask derived from an independent
data set that found amygdala activation mediating the framing effect
in subjects carrying the ss variant of the 5HTT-linked polymorphic
region (Roiser et al., 2009). To build this mask we used the contrast
image obtained in this previous study and thresholded it to pb0.001.
This mask only includes the left amygdala. If we assume that in the
present experiment we are studying the same phenomenon as in
Roiser et al., the laterality of the effects would be expected to be the
same. Post hoc, we determined whole brain effects in our experiment,
primarily for descriptive purposes, where the resulting z statistic
images from the second level analysis were thresholded at pb0.005
and reported in the supplementary Table S4. Signiﬁcant activations
are displayed by superimposition of the SPM maps on our group
templates in Fig. 4 and Fig. S10.
Results
Cue induced biases in economic decision making
During the learning task, prior to the actual gamble task, subjects
had learned to choose the fractal associated with an 80% probability of
winning £10 and to avoid the fractal associated with an 80%
probability of losing £10 (Fig. 3A and Figs. S5A and S6A). Subjects
were explicitly told that both tasks were independent and indeed,
most subjects reported that the CS's displayed under the safe option
did not induce a bias in their decisions (15/20 in experiment 1; 12/14
in experiment 2; and 19/20 in experiment 3).
Subjects’ choices in the gamble task were affected by the presence
of the incidental conditioned fractal images, that predicted losses and
wins in the separate learning task, in all three experiments (Fig. 2 and
Figs. S1–S3), a ﬁnding analogous in form to what we found in
Fig. 3. Observed andmodeled results in experiment 3. (A) The observed learning curves depict, trial by trial, the proportion of subjects that chose the fractal with highest probability
of monetary win (win pair) in blue, with highest probability of monetary lose (lose pair) in red, and a given fractal without any monetary outcome (neutral pair) in grey. The
numbers in the x axis highlights the beginning of each session alternating gamble and learning task. (B) The probability of gambling for each of the CS displayed under the sure option
in each session, shows that the preference for the gamble when the safe option was displayed over the CSwin decreased over sessions, whereas the preference for the gamble when
the safe option was displayed over the CSlose increased. (C) The modeled learning curves depict, trial by trial, the probabilities of choices as simulated by a computational model
based on a group-wise model ﬁt. (D) Probability of gambling simulated by the computational model for each of the CS displayed under the sure option in each session.
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et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, in experiment 1 and 2we found amain effect
of CS (F(2,38)=3.94; P=0.046 l for experiment 1; and F(2,26)=
4.34; P=0.042 for experiment 2), without any signiﬁcant main effect
of session (F(1,38)=0.89; pN0.1 for experiment 1; and F(2,26)=
1.59; pN0.1 for experiment 2) or CS by session interaction (F(2,38)=
2.5; pN0.1 for experiment 1; and F(2,26)=1.87; pN0.1 for experi-
ment 2). Importantly, these effects had a valence directionality
evident by an increased preference for the gamble option when the CS
loss stimulus was presented with the sure option and a decreased
preference for the gamble option when the CSwin was displayed
under the sure option (For experiment 1: CSwin versus CSlose, t19=
2.47, p=0.023; CSwin versus CS-, t19=1.48, pN0.1; CSlose versus
CS-, t19=2.57, p=0.019; for experiment 2: CSwin versus CSlose, t13=
2.37, p=0.034; CSwin versus CS-, t13=1.67, pN0.1; CSlose versus
CS-, t19=2.04, p=0.062).
In experiment 3, although we did not observed any main effect of
CS (F(2,38)=0.47; pN0.1) or session (F(2,38)=3.2; pN0.1), we
observed a signiﬁcant session by CS interaction (F(4,76)=4.83;
P=0.004). This interaction reﬂected the emergence of the same
pattern of conditioned stimulus induced preferences, that we
observed in experiment 1 and 2, by the third session (CSwin versus
CSlose in last session, t19=3.46, p=0.003; CSwin versus CS- in last
session, t19=0.9, pN1; CSlose versus CS- in last session, t19=2.19,
p=0.041). Together with the emergence of the behavioral bias in
session 3, we also found that subjects became gradually faster at
making their decisions from session 1 to 3 as shown by a session effect
on reaction time data (mean reaction time across conditions was
896.6 ms, 864.7 ms, and 810.1 ms for sessions 1, 2, and 3, respectively;
F(2,38)=20.2; pb0.001; in the lack of CS or session by CS interaction
(F2,38)=0.5; pN0.1; and F(4,76)=1.6; pN0.1). Although we did not
ﬁnd any session or session by CS interaction in experiment 1 and 2,
the effects of CS were stronger in the last session for each experiment:when the effects of CS were looked separately for each session, an
effect of CS on the probability of gambling was only observed in the
last session of each experiment. Details in relation to how this effect
evolved across sessions are detailed in Figs. S1–S3.
The source of the observed bias in the gamble task induced by
the presence of the CSs cannot be accounted for by an effect on
task difﬁculty since the presence of the different CS's did not in-
ﬂuence subjects’ reaction times for their decisions (Experiment 1:
CSwin, 1503.9 ms; CSlose, 1487.3 ms; CS-, 1496.8 ms; main effect of
CS F(2,38)=0.155, n.s.; Experiment 2: CSwin, 869.5 ms; CSlose,
890.9 ms; CS-, 883.8 ms; main effect of CS F(2,26)=1.14, n.s.;
Experiment 3: CSwin, 858.4 ms; CSlose, 860.9 ms; CS-, 852.1 ms;
main effect of CS F(2,38)=0.5; n.s.). Moreover, subjects’ attention to
the task persisted throughout the entire experiment evident in the
fact that they made accurate choices according to the expected value
of the different options in catch trials (Fig. S4).
Amygdala activation and expression of behavioral biases
We found left amygdala [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
space coordinates (x,y,z) −20,4,−16; peak Z score=3.27; p=0.001
uncorrected; p=0.015 FWE] (Fig. 4) expressed a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between decision (gamble or not) and the parameter ε*|QCS|,
which indicated the magnitude of the effect of the CS on the decision
process. The left amygdala was activated in conditions where the
presence of the CSlose under the sure option biased subjects to choose
the gamble option and where the CSwin under the sure option biased
subjects away from the gamble option. Although the mask that we
used only included the left amygdala, we did not observe any
activation in the right amygdala when performing an exploratory
analysis at a more liberal threshold, suggesting that in the present
experiment the amygdala response showed a left-sided laterality, as
found previously in an fMRI study of the framing effect (Roiser et al.,
Fig. 4. fMRI results. (A) Interaction of parametric regressors [(Sure/CSwin+Gamble/CSlose)− (Gamble/CSwin+Sure/CSlose)]; brain activation reﬂecting the emergence of the CS
induced bias with the progression of the experiment, namely choosing the gamble option when the CS loss is presented and choosing the safe option when CSwin is presented over
the safe option and weighted by a session speciﬁc parameter that relates to the magnitude of the behavioral impact of CS's on the decision making process. This analysis was
constrained by an inclusive mask using a similar interaction derived from an independent data set that found amygdala activation for behavioral biases in decision making (see text for
details). A cluster of highly signiﬁcant activationwas observedwithin thismask in the left amygdala (peak Z score=3.27; P=0.015 FWE; P=0.001 uncorrected). (B) Parameter estimates
at the peak coordinates of the cluster. Coordinates are given in MNI space. Error bars indicate SEM. (C) Display of the used inclusive mask at the same y coordinates as A and B.
212 M. Guitart-Masip et al. / NeuroImage 53 (2010) 206–2142009). For descriptive purposes, we also determined post hoc whole
brain effects of this interaction contrast (pb0.005 uncorrected,
supplementary Table S4). Remarkably, we also found a large cluster of
activation in the right ventral striatum (anterior caudate) [MNI space
coordinates12, 22, 0; peak Z score=3.34; pb0.001, uncorrected].
Discussion
We show that the incidental presentation of stimuli that predict
wins and losses can bias independent economic decision making
under uncertainty. These inﬂuences of conditioned stimuli we observe
is similar to an inﬂuence elicited bymere presentation of gain and lose
semantic frames as seen in classical framing experiments. Moreover,
the emergence of this bias was related to amygdala activation which
shows that the striking similarity between the behavioral effects,
observed with the present paradigm and classical framing effects, also
extends to its neurobiological underpinnings.
It is known that reward and punishment conditioned stimuli
generate approach and withdrawal responses towards the stimuli
(see Everitt et al., 2003; Kim and Jung, 2006) for reviews in appetitive
and aversive conditioning, respectively). The increased preference
towards the gamble option when the CSlose was presented under the
sure option can be conceived of as a withdrawal from a stimulus that
predicts a loss. On the other hand, the decreased preference towards
the gamble option observedwhen the CSwinwas presented under the
sure option can be conceived of as enhanced approach to a stimulus
that has been learned to predict wins. Therefore, we suggest that after
learning an association between stimuli and outcome through
instrumental conditioning in the learning task, the CSwin and the
CSlose generate expectations of reward and punishment. These
automatically access a Pavlovian system, which triggers an associated
unconditioned response such as approach or withdrawal which we
suggest is the mechanism by which the CSs induce the observed
decision biases in the unrelated gamble task.
Note that although our training task was instrumental it is widely
accepted that the type of conditioning we implemented involves both
Pavlovian and instrumental mechanisms (Kim and Jung, 2006;
Mackintosh, 1983). We are aware that it is difﬁcult to disentangle
what is purely Pavlovian or instrumental in our experimental setting.
However, in the critical test phase it was the mere presence of these
predictive stimuli, without a requirement to perform a learnt action
that was critical to the decision biasing effect we observed. This
behavioral effect is then reminiscent of a Pavlovian instrumentaltransfer (PIT) experiments in which the amount of responses in an
instrumental task to obtain reward is increased by the mere
presentation of a conditioned stimulus that has been learned to
predict reward (Lovibond, 1983) and the instrumental response to
avoid punishment is increased by the mere presentation of a
conditioned stimulus that has been learned to predict punishment
(Overmier et al., 1971).
The involvement of the amygdala in generating decision biases
points to a key role for the Pavlovian system, a system also implicated
in sign tracking (Parkinson et al., 2000), fear conditioning (Phelps and
LeDoux, 2005), the generation of Pavlovian to instrumental interac-
tions including conditioned reinforcement (Burns et al., 1993) and an
invigorating effect on instrumental actions (Hall et al., 2001; Talmi
et al., 2008). The overarching role of the Pavlovian system in these
diverse contexts can be conceptualised in terms of information
provision in relation to motivational state to an otherwise motiva-
tionally less ﬂexible habitual system (Dayan and Balleine, 2002). We
acknowledge that other brain areas may also be implicated in the
observed effects. However, our a priori hypothesis was restricted to
the amygdala and as shown by our exploratory analysis the caudate
and the insula were also activated in the expression of the decision
bias driven by the conditioned fractal images. Indeed, the striatum is a
key brain area implicated in the expression of Pavlovian/instrumental
interactions in animals (Cardinal et al., 2002) and humans (Talmi
et al., 2008). It has been suggested that the neural mechanism that
generates Pavlovian/instrumental interactions requires translation of
an affective signal, mediated by amygdala, to processes implemented
in the striatum. One potential mechanism by which this could be
achieved is through amygdala projections to the dopaminergic
midbrain that would then modulate neuronal processing in the
striatum (Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Cardinal et al., 2002).
It is of interest that the impact of conditioned stimuli in experi-
ment 3 became stronger as the experiment progressed. As subjects
becomemore experienced with the gamble task they are likely to rely
more on habitual or automated mechanisms in making their
decisions, a context where the inﬂuences of conditioned associations
on instrumental performance is known to be more robust (Dickinson
and Balleine, 2001). As the habitual system does not use an explicit
model of the outcomes of actions, the Pavlovian and instrumental
representations of value interact more closely when a behavior
becomes habitual, resulting in larger PIT effects when subjects rely
more on habitual mechanisms to make decisions in the gamble task. A
general view on habit formation assumes that behavior begins as goal
213M. Guitart-Masip et al. / NeuroImage 53 (2010) 206–214directed but becomes habitual through reinforcement in a stable
environment. For example, after habituation has taken place, the
behavior is no longer inﬂuenced by outcome devaluation, a hallmark of
goal directedness (Dickinson & Balleine, 2001). Although subjects were
never reinforced in the gamble task, the latency effect, where subjects
became gradually faster at making decisions from session 1 to 3, is
consistent with ﬁndings from skill learning that performing an action
many times, evenwithout receiving explicit reinforcement, leads to this
action becoming automated, as expressed in habit (Doyon et al., 2003).
Therefore, our data supports the suggestion that subjects’ decision
process became more automated as the task progressed and thereby
become more susceptible to conditioned inﬂuences. In experiment 1
and 2 the behavioral bias elicited by the CS was much stronger and
observed over all sessions without any apparent interaction with
session. In the context of scanning this behavioral effect showed an
interactionwith session, andwas only signiﬁcant at a group level during
the third session. However, we also observed in both our preliminary
behavioral studies (experiments 1 and 2) that the effect of the CS on
decision making became stronger as the experiment progressed.
Whereas experiment 1 and 2 were performed inside normal experi-
mental rooms, experiment 3was carried out inside the scanner and this
change in environment may well explain the differences in the
emergent pattern of behavior seen across the three different experi-
ments. For example, the novelty and ambient noise of the scanner
environment may have delayed the emergence of a more habit based
approach to performing the gamble task.
Our data provides convergent behavioral and neurobiological
evidence that a bias in decision making reﬂects the dominance of a
Pavlovian valuation system on goal-directed decision making under
uncertainty. Incidental stimuli that predict losses and wins in an
entirely different context to that of the gamble task, appear to have
generated avoidance and approach tendencies with respect to the
sure option and, in so doing, distorted subjects’ behavioural
preferences. These distortions result in a context bias identical in
form to that reported in the framing effect (De Martino et al., 2006;
Roiser et al., 2009). The fact that framing tasks use emotionally laden
words, such as ‘lose’ and ‘win,’ semantics known to generate approach
and avoidance tendencies (Chen and Bargh, 1999), supports our
suggestion that decision biases can arise solely out of a conditioned
effect. Although our computational model also supports this view, the
modelling results need to be taken with caution because alternative
models have not been tested and the model ﬁt to the data is often
suboptimal. In terms of mechanisms we suggest that Pavlovian action
tendencies approach or avoid, generated by stimuli that predict wins
or losses bias the level of control exercised by an instrumental system
that, rationally, should not care about these irrelevant stimuli.
Emotional laden words whose meaning has been experienced
repeatedly over the entire lifespan may act as much stronger
conditioned association than our fractal images that were newly
associated with their respective outcomes. This could potentially
explain why the standard framing effect as studied with manipula-
tions of the wording of the different choice options is much stronger
than the effects that we observed and can be seen after a single
presentation (Kahneman et al., 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981,
1986). Although in the present work we show how the Pavlovian
system can be a source of distortion in economic decision making, it
is worth noting that these kind of biases are likely to be of
evolutionary beneﬁt in so far as they are conserved across phylogeny
where they are likely to provide, on average, reliable predictions
about expected reward and punishments in situations of uncertainty.Acknowledgments
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